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Abstract
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006) intro-
duced a generalized state-space model that
allows for non-trivial unawareness among
several individuals and strong properties of
knowledge. We show that this generalized
state-space model arises naturally if states
consist of maximally consistent sets of for-
mulas in an appropriate logical formulation.
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1 Introduction
Unawareness refers to lack of conception rather than
to lack of information. In standard models of incom-
plete information, decision makers share the concep-
tion of the interactive decision problem but may have
asymmetric information. While models of asymmet-
ric information are common in game theory and eco-
nomics, the modelling of unawareness in interactive
decision making proves to be a tricky task. Modica
and Rustichini (1994) and Dekel, Lipman and Rusti-
chini (1998) showed that standard state-space models
of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms
of unawareness.
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006) introduced a gener-
alized state-space model that allows for non-trivial un-
awareness among several individuals and strong prop-
erties of knowledge. Such an unawareness structure
involves as primitives a lattice of state-spaces ordered
according to their strength of “expressive power,” and
suitable projections among them. The possibility set
of one individual in a state of one space may reside
in a lower space, while the possibility set of a second
individual in one of these possible states may reside
in yet a lower space. The former phenomenon reﬂects
the fact that the ﬁrst individual is unaware of some as-
pects of reality, and conceives fewer dimensions of the
situation than there actually are; the latter reﬂects the
fact that the ﬁrst individual considers as possible that
the second individual is unaware of some aspects of
which the ﬁrst individual is aware. That’s how the
model captures mutual beliefs about unawareness.
In this paper we substantiate this construction with
logical building blocks. Such an investigation of foun-
dations is indeed necessary. Any structure for mod-
elling asymmetric cognition – even if it has the desired
properties – begs the question whether the model itself
should not be an object for further uncertainties of the
individuals. One way to show that a model is compre-
hensive is to describe in minute detail the beliefs and
mutual beliefs of all individuals in each state. If each
relevant combination of such beliefs are described in
some state of the model, then we are convinced that
the phenomena we aim at modelling is captured by our
construction.
For the case of knowledge and mutual knowledge, such
a detailed substantiation of the beliefs in the standard
partition model has been carried out by constructing
the canonical model of all maximally-consistent sets of
formulas in the S5 system of epistemic logic (Aumann,
1999). This is the standard propositional logic (with
negations, conjunctions and disjunctions of formulas),
augmented with a knowledge modality for each indi-
vidual: For each formula ϕ and each individual i, there
is also a formula kiϕ (“individual i knows ϕ”). The ax-
ioms of the system then specify (on top of the standard
logical tautologies) that what an individual knows is
true, and that the individual knows what she knows
and what she ignores. The canonical construction in
which the states are the maximally-consistent sets of
formulas in this logical system turns out to have a nat-
177ural partition structure, and the knowledge of events
in this partition model reﬂects exactly the knowledge
of formulas in the states. That’s how the canonical
model is substantiated by the internal structure of its
own states.
In this paper we aim at an analogous foundation for
the case of unawareness. Two main diﬀerences arise.
First, the axiom system has to be amended: An in-
dividual knows that she doesn’t know some fact only
if she is aware of that fact. Our axiom system mani-
fests this feature, and is thus (equivalent to) a multi-
person version of axiom systems proposed by Modica
and Rustichini (1999) and Halpern (2001).
Second, in the lattice of spaces of an unawareness
structure, only the states in the upper-most space are
full descriptions of all aspects of reality relevant to
the interaction among the individuals. States in lower
spaces are subjective portraits of situations, in the
mind of individuals who are unaware of some of these
relevant dimensions. Therefore, to construct these
subjective descriptions, one has to use a sub-language,
with a proper subset of the primitive propositions of
the logical syntax.
With these modiﬁcations done, we are able to ac-
complish our mission: The collections of maximally-
consistent sets of formulas (across all sub-languages)
constitute an unawareness structure (Theorem 1), in
which knowledge of events reﬂects exactly the knowl-
edge of formulas in states (Theorem 2).
This result entails an important corollary. Logicians
are often interested whether an axiom system is sound
and complete with respect to a given family of models.
Soundness means that every theorem derivable from
the axioms obtains in all states of all these models.
Completeness means the reverse implication: Every
formula that obtains in all states of all the models in
the family is provable from the axioms of the system.
Our results imply that the axiom system we devised
is sound and complete with respect to the family of
unawareness structures (Theorem 3).1
The caveat here is that each space in the lattice of
an unawareness structure is associated with a sub-
language (determined by a subset of the primitive
propositions), and that higher spaces in the lattice are
associated with richer sub-languages. In a state which
is a subjective description of reality in the mind of an
individual who is unaware of a primitive proposition
ϕ, neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ would obtain. If one were to in-
1In fact, even strong soundness and completeness are
implied: A set of formulas Γ is consistent (that is, free of
contradiction) if and only if there is a state in a model in
which Γ obtains.
sist on a truth value for ϕ in such a state, it would
have to be “mu” – a third value, distinct than “true”
and “false”. This would lead to a three-valued logic,
with an extended axiom system that accounts for the
third truth value. In parallel work, Halpern and Rˆ ego
(2005) have developed such a three-valued sound and
complete axiomatization for the family of our unaware-
ness structures.
2 Syntax and Axioms
Let X be the nonempty set of atomic formulas or prim-
itive propositions, and let I be the set of individuals.
We assume I to be nonempty, but otherwise no restric-
tion is imposed (so I could be inﬁnite, even uncount-
able).
The syntax is the usual multi-person modal syntax
with knowledge modalities ki, “negation” ¬, “and” ∧
and a constant > for truth. As usual, ∨, →, and ←→
are abbreviations, deﬁned in the usual way.
The set of formulas LX is the smallest set such that:
• > is a formula,
• every x ∈ X is a formula,
• if ϕ is a formula, then ¬ϕ is a formula,
• if ϕ and ψ are formulas, then ϕ ∧ ψ is a formula,
• if ϕ is a formula, then kiϕ is a formula.
The awareness modality is deﬁned by aiϕ := kiϕ ∨
ki¬kiϕ and the unawareness modality is deﬁned by
uiϕ := ¬aiϕ.
For a formula ϕ of our language, deﬁne Pr(ϕ) to be
the set of primitive propositions occurring in ϕ.
The axiom system S5 (see for example Chellas, 1980,
pp. 14 or Fagin et al. 1995, p. 56) corresponds to stan-
dard partitional models usually applied in economics.
This axiom system is weakened to the following sys-
tem:
• All substitution instances of valid formulas of
Propositional Calculus including the formula >,
(PC)
• the inference rule Modus Ponens:
ϕ, ϕ → ψ
ψ
, (MP)
• the Axiom of Truth:
kiϕ → ϕ, (T)
178• the Axiom of Positive Introspection:
kiϕ → kikiϕ. (4)
• the Propositional Awareness axioms:
1. aiϕ ←→ ai¬ϕ,
2. aiϕ ∧ aiψ ←→ ai (ϕ ∧ ψ),
3. aiϕ ←→ aikjϕ,for j ∈ I.
(PA)
• and the inference rule RK-Inference: For all nat-
ural numbers n ≥ 1: If ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕn and ϕ are
formulas such that Pr(ϕ) ⊆
Sn
i=1 Pr(ϕi) then
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn → ϕ
kiϕ1 ∧ kiϕ2 ∧ ... ∧ kiϕn → kiϕ
. (RK)
A tautology is a valid formula of Propositional Calcu-
lus.
The set of theorems is the smallest set of formulas
that contain all the axioms (that is all the substitution
instances of valid formulas of Propositional Calculus,
Truth, the Propositional Awareness Axioms and Ax-
iom (4)) and that is closed under the inference rules
Modus Ponens and RK-Inference.
Let Γ be a set of formulas and ϕ a formula. A proof
of ϕ from Γ is a ﬁnite sequence of formulas such that
the last formula is ϕ and such that each formula is a
formula in Γ, a theorem of the system or inferred from
the previous formulas by Modus Ponens. If there is a
proof of ϕ from Γ, then we write Γ ` ϕ. In particular,
` ϕ means that ϕ is a theorem. If Γ ` ϕ, we say that
Γ implies ϕ syntactically.
A set Γ of formulas is consistent if and only if there is
no formula ϕ such that Γ ` ϕ and Γ ` ¬ϕ. A set Γ of
formulas is inconsistent, if it is not consistent.
RK-inference implies immediately that
kiϕ ∧ ki (ϕ → ψ) → kiψ and kiϕ ∧ kiψ → ki (ϕ ∧ ψ)
are theorems.
The axiomatization implies that aiϕ → kiaiϕ is a the-
orem.
For every formula ϕ we have that aiϕ ↔
V
x∈Pr(ϕ) aix
is a theorem. Hence an individual i is aware of a for-
mula if and only if she is aware of all primitive propo-
sitions in this formula.
If ϕ is a theorem, then aiϕ → kiϕ is theorem. Hence
{aiϕ} ` kiϕ, if ϕ is a theorem.
That is, the following weaker form of the standard in-
ference rule Necessitation obtains: Whenever an in-
dividual is aware of a theorem, then he knows that
theorem.
3 Unawareness Structures
In this section we recall the deﬁnition of unawareness
structures in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006).
Let S = {Sα}α∈A be a complete lattice of disjoint
state spaces, with a partial order  on S. Denote by
Σ =
S
α∈A Sα the union of these spaces.
For every S and S0 such that S0  S, there is a surjec-
tive projection rS
0
S : S0 → S, where rS
S is the identity.
Note that the cardinality of S is smaller than or equal
to the cardinality of S0. We require the projections
to commute: If S00  S0  S then rS
00
S = rS
0
S ◦ rS
00
S0 .
If s ∈ S0, denote sS = rS
0
S (s). If B ⊆ S0, denote
BS = {sS : s ∈ B}.
Denote g(S) = {S0 : S0  S}. For B ⊆ S, denote
B↑ =
S
S0∈g(S)

rS
0
S
−1
(B).
An event is a pair (E,S), where E = B↑ with B ⊆ S,
where S ∈ S. B is called the base and S the base-
space of (E,S), denoted by S(E). If E 6= ∅, then S is
uniquely determined by E and, abusing notation, we
write E for (E,S). Otherwise, we write ∅S for (∅,S).
Note that not every subset of Σ is an event.
If (B↑,S) is an event where B ⊆ S, the negation
¬(B↑,S) of (B↑,S) is deﬁned by ¬(B↑,S) := ((S \
B)↑,S). Abusing notation, we write ¬B↑ := (S \B)↑.
Note that by our notational convention, we have¬S↑ =
∅S and ¬∅S = S↑, for each space S ∈ S. ¬B↑ is typi-
cally a proper subset of the complement Σ\B
↑
. That
is, (S \ B)
↑ $ Σ\B
↑
. Thus our structure is not a stan-
dard state-space model in the sense of Dekel, Lipman,
and Rustichini (1998).
If
n
B
↑
λ,Sλ
o
λ∈L
is a set of events (with Bλ ⊆ Sλ,
for λ ∈ L), their conjunction
V
λ∈L

B
↑
λ,Sλ

is de-
ﬁned by
V
λ∈L

B
↑
λ,Sλ

:=
T
λ∈L B
↑
λ

,supλ∈L Sλ

.
Note, that since S is a complete lattice, supλ∈L Sλ ex-
ists. If S = supλ∈L Sλ, then we have
T
λ∈L B
↑
λ

=
T
λ∈L
 
rS
Sλ
−1
(Bλ)
↑
. Again, abusing notation,
we write
V
λ∈L B
↑
λ :=
T
λ∈L B
↑
λ (we will therefore use
the conjunction symbol ∧ and the intersection symbol
∩ interchangeably).
We deﬁne the relation ⊆ between events (E,S) and
(F,S0), by (E,S) ⊆ (F,S0) if and only if E ⊆ F as sets
and S0  S. If E 6= ∅, we have that (E,S) ⊆ (F,S0)
if and only if E ⊆ F as sets. Note however that for
E = ∅S we have (E,S) ⊆ (F,S0) if and only if S0  S.
Hence we can write E ⊆ F instead of (E,S) ⊆ (F,S0)
as long as we keep in mind that in the case of E = ∅S
we have ∅S ⊆ F if and only if S  S(F). It follows
179from these deﬁnitions that for events E and F, E ⊆ F
is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only when E and F have
the same base, i.e., S(E) = S(F).
The disjunction of
n
B
↑
λ
o
λ∈L
is deﬁned by the de Mor-
gan law
W
λ∈L B
↑
λ = ¬
V
λ∈L ¬

B
↑
λ

. Typically
W
λ∈L B
↑
λ $
S
λ∈L B
↑
λ, and if all Bλ are nonempty we
have that
W
λ∈L B
↑
λ =
S
λ∈L B
↑
λ holds if and only if all
the B
↑
λ have the same base-space.
For each individual i ∈ I there is a possibility corre-
spondence Πi : Σ → 2Σ with the following properties:
0. Conﬁnedness: If s ∈ S then Πi(s) ⊆ S0 for some
S0  S.
1. Generalized Reﬂexivity: s ∈ Π
↑
i (s) for every s ∈
Σ.2
2. Stationarity: s0 ∈ Πi (s) implies Πi (s0) = Πi (s).
3. Projections Preserve Awareness: If s ∈ S0, s ∈
Πi(s) and S  S0 then sS ∈ Πi (sS).
4. Projections Preserve Ignorance: If s ∈ S0 and S 
S0 then Π
↑
i (s) ⊆ Π
↑
i (sS).
5. Projections Preserve Knowledge: If S  S0  S00,
s ∈ S00 and Πi(s) ⊆ S0 then (Πi (s))S = Πi (sS).
Generalized Reﬂexivity and Stationarity are the ana-
logues of the partitional properties of the possibility
correspondence in partitional information structures.
In particular, Generalized Reﬂexivity will yield the
truth property (that what an individual knows indeed
obtains); Stationarity will guarantee the introspection
properties (that an individual knows what she knows
and that an individual knows what she ignores pro-
vided she is aware of it).
Properties 3. to 5. guarantee the coherence of the
knowledge and the awareness of individuals down the
lattice structure. They compare the possibility sets
of an individual in a state s and its projection sS.
The properties guarantee that, ﬁrst, at the projected
state sS the individual knows nothing she does not
know at s, and second, at the projected state sS the
individual is not aware of anything she is unaware of
at s (Projections Preserve Ignorance). Third, at the
projected state sS the individual knows every event
she knows at s, provided that this event is based in a
space lower than or equal to S (Projections Preserve
Knowledge). Fourth, at the projected state sS the
2Here and in what follows, we abuse notation slightly
and write Π
↑
i(ω) for (Πi(ω))
↑.
individual is aware of every event she is aware of at s,
provided that this event is based in a space lower than
or equal to S (Projections Preserve Awareness).
Deﬁnition 1. The tuple
Σ :=

(Sα)α∈A ,

r
Sα
Sβ

SβSα
,(Πi)i∈I

,
is called an unawareness structure for the set of indi-
viduals I.
Deﬁnition 2. The knowledge operator of individ-
ual i on events E is deﬁned, as usual, by Ki(E) :=
{s ∈ Σ : Πi (s) ⊆ E}, if there is a state s such that
Πi (s) ⊆ E, and by Ki(E) := ∅S(E) otherwise.
The following proposition is proved in Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper (2006):
Proposition 1. If E is an event, then Ki(E) is an
S(E)-based event.
Deﬁnition 3. The unawareness operator of individ-
ual i from events to events is deﬁned by Ui(E) =
¬Ki(E) ∩ ¬Ki¬Ki(E), and the awareness operator is
then naturally deﬁned by Ai(E) = ¬Ui(E).
This is the Modica-Rustichini (1999) deﬁnition.
By Proposition 1 and the deﬁnition of the negation,
we have Ai(E) = Ki(E) ∪ Ki¬Ki(E).
For further properties of the unawareness structure see
the complete paper.
4 The Canonical Unawareness
Structure
Where do unawareness structures come from? What
formal properties of knowledge and awareness do they
capture? And can one model by unawareness struc-
tures all situations with such properties?
In this section we shall approach these questions by us-
ing the logical apparatus from section 2. “Properties”
will be expressed by formulas of the syntax deﬁned
there; a “situation” will be a description of proper-
ties (a set of formulas) which is both consistent in the
system (i.e. does not entail a contradiction), and com-
prehensive (i.e., for each potential property of knowl-
edge and awareness, the description contains either the
property or its negation).
We shall show that the collection of all such descrip-
tions of situations does indeed constitute an unaware-
ness structure (theorem 1 below). This unawareness
structure is called the canonical unawareness struc-
ture. Any formula that belongs to some state of the
canonical structure, and expresses knowledge or aware-
ness, is mirrored accurately by a corresponding prop-
180erty of knowledge or awareness of events in the struc-
ture, a property that obtains in that state (theorem 2
below).
In short, the canonical unawareness structure consists
of all the consistent and comprehensive descriptions of
mutual knowledge and awareness, and these explicit
descriptions are reﬂected by the knowledge and aware-
ness operators on events in this structure. This sub-
stantiates the use of unawareness structure by provid-
ing an adequate foundation, and addresses the ques-
tions posed at the beginning of this section.
We now proceed with the deﬁnition of the canonical
unawareness structure. Recall that X is the set of
primitive propositions. For a subset α ⊆ X, let Ωα
be the set of maximally consistent sets ωα of formulas
in the sub-language Lα, that is, ωα is consistent and
for every formula ϕ ∈ Lα\ωα, the set ωα ∪ {ϕ} is
inconsistent. Let Ω =
S
α⊆X Ωα. We deﬁne Ωβ  Ωα
whenever β ⊆ α.
This makes {Ωα}α⊆X into a lattice of spaces. To com-
plete its deﬁnition as the canonical unawareness struc-
ture, we proceed by deﬁning the projections among the
spaces and the possibility correspondences of individ-
uals.
Lemma 1. Let α ⊆ X and Γ ⊆ Lα. If Γ is a con-
sistent subset of Lα then it can be extended to a max-
imally consistent subset ωα of Lα.
If Ωα  Ωβ (i.e., α ⊇ β) we deﬁne a projection rα
β :
Ωα −→ Ωβ by rα
β(ω) := ω ∩ Lβ.
Proposition 2. The projection rα
β is well-deﬁned and
surjective.
Remark 1. If α ⊇ β ⊇ γ then rα
γ = rβ
γ ◦ rα
β.
For every formula ϕ, denote [ϕ] := {ω ∈ Ω : ϕ ∈ ω}.
Proposition 3. [ϕ] is an event.
Deﬁnition 4. For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I deﬁne the
possibility set
Πi(ω) =



ω0 ∈ Ω :
For every formula ϕ
(i) kiϕ ∈ ω implies ϕ ∈ ω0
(ii) aiϕ ∈ ω iﬀ (ϕ ∈ ω0 or ¬ϕ ∈ ω0)



.
Deﬁnition 5. For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I deﬁne
α(ω,i) := {x ∈ X | ai (x) ∈ ω}.
Proposition 4. For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I we have
ω ∩ Lα(ω,i) ∈ Πi (ω).
Theorem 1. For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I, Πi (ω) is
nonempty and satisﬁes the properties 0. - 5. of a
possibility correspondence.
By Remark 1, Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 it follows
that
Corollary 1. The tuple
Ω :=
D
(Ωα)α⊆X ,
 
rα
β

β⊆α⊆X ,(Πi)i∈I
E
,
is an unawareness structure for the set of individuals
I.
The deﬁnition of the canonical unawareness structure
is hence complete. We now proceed to show that the
internal structure of its states is indeed reﬂected by
operations on events in the structure. In particular,
knowledge as expressed in syntactic terms within a
state (kiϕ) gets translated to knowledge of the corre-
sponding event (Ki [ϕ]).
Theorem 2. For ϕ ∈ L, we have
[¬ϕ] = ¬[ϕ],
[ϕ ∧ ψ] = [ϕ] ∩ [ψ],
[kiϕ] = Ki [ϕ].
It follows that for ϕ ∈ L, we have Ai [ϕ] = [aiϕ] and
Ui [ϕ] = [uiϕ].
4.1 Semantics, Soundness and Completeness
In this section we have to show how the canonical un-
awareness structure manifests that our axiom system
is strongly sound and strongly complete with respect
the family of unawareness structures. Strong sound-
ness means that if a formula ϕ is provable from a set of
formulas Γ (with the same set of atomic propositions
as in ϕ), then ϕ obtains in all states of all unaware-
ness structures in which Γ obtains. Strong complete-
ness means the reverse implication: If ϕ obtains in all
states of all unawareness structures in which such a
Γ obtains, then ϕ is provable from Γ. Strong sound-
ness and strong completeness is thus another way to
formulate the sense in which the axiom system pro-
vides a foundation and substantiates the notion of an
unawareness structure.
Strong completeness means that syntactic implication
follows from semantic implication. Strong complete-
ness is equivalent to that every consistent set of for-
mulas is true in some state in some unawareness struc-
ture.
After having deﬁned evaluation functions v : X −→ E,
where E is the set of events; unawareness models
Σ
v := (Σ,v); the model relation (Σ
v,s) |= ϕ, where s
is a state in Σ; and the notion of semantic implication
Γ |= ϕ (for formal deﬁnitions, see the complete arti-
cle); we can formulate and prove the following strong
characterization Theorem. It says that the notions of
semantic and syntactic implication coincide:
Theorem 3. (Strong soundness and strong
completeness) For Γ ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L, we have Γ ` ϕ
181if and only if Γ |= ϕ. Furthermore, Γ ` ϕ if and
only if in the canonical unawareness model Ω, for every
ω ∈ Ωα such that Pr(ϕ) ⊆ α, we have that (Ω,ω) |= Γ
implies (Ω,ω) |= ϕ.
Corollary 2. A set of formulas is consistent if and
only if it has a model.
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